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CONVERSION OF CUSTOMERS' PROPERTY BY
SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS: THE APPLICABILTY OF
RULE 10b-5 IN THE "CONTRACTION ERA"
The provisions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(section 10(b))' and Rule l0b-52 provide the investing public with redress
for a wide variety of grievances related to securities transactions.3AA
Securities brokers conduct innumerable securities transactions, and, therefore, securities brokers are often the subject of Rule lOb-5 claims in
connection with broker management of customer investment accounts. 4 Rule
lOb-5 provides significant protection to brokerage customers.5
Broker customers occasionally seek Rule lOb-5 protection from broker
conversions of the customer property. The tort of conversion occurs when
a person exercises dominion and control over property in a manner incon-

1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-. . .(b) to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule lOb-5, which the Securities Exchange Comission
promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
3. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979). Rule
1Ob-5 applies to the trading of securities on the basis of undisclosed material information, the
distribution of misleading information about a corporation, selective disclosures of material
nonpublic information, which is known as tipping, manipulation of a securities market,
improper management of a corporation, and improper actions by securities brokers. Id; see
Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5 On Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL
L. REV. 869, 870-71 (1972) (discussing applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker-dealer activities).
4. See A. JACOBS, LriIGATION AN PRACTIcE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 210 (1986)(discussing
use of Rule lob-5 as cause of action against securities brokers for mismanagement of customer
accounts); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 876-973 (same); Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by
Securities Professionals, 61 TEx. L. Rav. 1247, 1279-91 (1983) (same).
5. See JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 210 (discussing Rule lob-5 provision of redress to
customers against securities brokers for mismanagement of customers accounts); Jacobs, supra note
3, at 876-973 (same); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1279-91 (same).
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sistent with the rights of the property owner. 6 Brokers can convert customer

property in a number of ways.7 The broker may steal cash or securities
from the customer's account,8 or pledge customer securities to a third party
lender as collateral for loans to the broker or to the brokerage firm.9 The
broker also may convert customer property by engaging in unauthorized
trading, which involves purchasing or selling securities on behalf of the
customer without the customer's consent.' 0 Prior to the "Contraction Era"",
during which the United States Supreme Court has restricted the scope of

Rule lOb-5, broker conversions of customer property were valid bases for
Rule lOb-5 claims. 12 Since the advent of the Contraction Era, however, the
federal courts have struggled to determine the applicability of Rule lOb-5
to acts of conversion by securities brokers. 3 Inconsistency among federal

court decisions concerning the applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker con-

6. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, 90 (5th ed. 1984).
7. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing ways by which broker can
convert customer property).
8. See PROSSER, supra note 6, at 96 (theft of property constitutes conversion).
9. See id. (non-owner's pledge of property without authority from owner is conversion).
10. See id. (unauthorized use of property by individual other than property owner is
conversion).
11. See 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LownE'Ins, SEcuR=s FRAUD & COMMODnIms FRAuD §
2.2, at (460)-(63) (1986) [hereinafter BROMBERG] (coining term "Contraction Era"). The
Contraction Era refers to the present period in the history of Rule lOb-5. Id. The Contraction
Era began in 1975 with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, restricting standing in Rule lob-5 actions. Id. § 2.2, at (460)-(63); see
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); infra notes 15-31 and
accompanying text (discussing Blue Chip Stamps). Since 1975 the Supreme Court consistently
has ruled against expanding the scope of Rule lOb-5. BROMBERO, supra, §2.2, at (460)-(63).
12. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-11 &
11 n.7 (1971) (misappropriation of proceeds of sale of security violates Rule lOb-5); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1094-95 (2d Cir. 1972) (misappropriation of
securities violates Rule lOb-5); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 40 (10th Cir. 1971)
(Rule lOb-5 applies to scheme to convert stock); SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376,
377 (2d Cir. 1970) (broker's unauthorized pledge of customer securities violates Rule lOb-5);
Newman v. Smith, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P95,078, at 97,785
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ( broker's unauthorized trading of customer securities violates Rule lOb-5);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.Supp. 417, 442-43 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (broker theft of
customer securities, facilitated by ruse on customer, violates Rule lOb-5), modified on other
grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444
(N.D. Ill. 1967) (broker misappropriation of cash, which customer had remitted to broker to
pay for securities that customer had ordered, violates Rule lOb-5); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (broker conversion
of customer cash violates Rule lOb-5). See generally JACOBS, supra note 4, §§ 38.02[b], at
nn.48-50; 67.02; 212.04; 213 (discussing Rule lob-5 applicability to broker conversions of
customer property); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 955, 957-58 (same); Langevoort, supra note 4,
at 1287 n.172 (same).
13. See JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 213 (discussing applicability of Rule lob-5 to broker
conversions of customer property); infra notes 42-140 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial precedent concerning applicability of Rule lob-5 to broker conversion of customer
property).
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versions
has created significant confusion in an important area of securities
4
law.'
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores5 and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green16 marked
the advent of the Contraction Era and provide limiting principles that
restrict the scope of causes of action under Rule lOb-5.17 In Blue Chip
Stamps, the plaintiff, an investor, claimed that the prospectus of an issuing
corporation purposely and fraudulently had understated the company's
value.18 The plaintiff further claimed that in reliance upon the information
in the prospectus, the plaintiff had refrained from purchasing securities and
had suffered damage as a result. 9 The United States District Court for the
Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure
to state a claim under Rule lOb-5. 20 The district court held that a Rule lOb5 plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities and that permitting
nonpurchasers and nonsellers to have Rule lOb-5 standing improperly would
allow recovery for speculative and conjectural losses. 21 In reversing the
district court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that some plaintiffs who were not purchasers or sellers
nonetheless could prove satisfactorily that the defendant's wrongdoing prevented the plaintiff from transacting in securities. 22 The Ninth Circuit opined
that a nonpurchaser or nonseller should have the opportunity to prove a
Rule lOb-5 claim, and that dismissal for failure to state a claim merely
because a plaintiff actually had not transacted in securities was too strict a
limitation upon the scope of Rule lOb-5. 23 The Supreme Court, however,
agreed with the district court and held that the plaintiff did not have
standing to bring a claim under Rule lOb-5 because the plaintiff had not
purchased or sold any security. 24

14. See infra notes 42-140 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court
decisions concerning applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversion of customer property).
15. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
16. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
17. See BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 2.2, at (460)-(63) (discussing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green as among landmark cases restricting
scope of Rule lOb-5). Federal courts commonly define the elements of a Rule lOb-5 cause of
action as the use of a facility or means of interstate commerce to facilitate fraud, manipulation,
or deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, with reckless disregard for
the interests of the plaintiff, and causing damage to the plaintiff. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball &
Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979). See generally JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 36
(discussing elements of Rule lob-5 cause of action).
18. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 726-27.
19. Id.
20. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 339 F.Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
21. Id.at 40.
22. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 492 F.2d 136, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1973).
23. Id. at 142.
24. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975).
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The Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps discussed several practical
grounds for the decision to deny the plaintiff's standing.25 The Court noted
that because the plaintiff actually had not transacted in securities, any award
of damages would be speculative and conjectural. 26 The Court also opined
that a decision to grant the plaintiff standing would spawn limitless and
vexatious litigation. 27 Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that
questions of credibility and questions of fact that were not objectively
verifiable would permeate litigation because the weight of the plaintiff's
case would rest upon his oral testimony regarding his intention to purchase
securities. 28 The Court noted that if the plaintiff was not a purchaser or
seller, the plaintiff's Rule 10b-5 claim would be difficult to dispose of prior
to trial, and would place undue pressure on the defendant to settle a
potentially baseless claim. 29 The Supreme Court also noted that recognizing
standing under Rule 10b-5 for persons who had neither purchased nor sold
securities would force the defendant corporation to conduct business under
the pressure and risk of limitless liability to a limitless class.3 0 The Supreme
Court found that the practical ramifications of recognizing standing for
nonpurchasers and nonsellers demanded that standing under Rule lOb-5
extend only to persons who had transacted in securities, and not to persons
who claimed that they 3 would have transacted in securities absent the
defendant's wrongdoing. '
The Supreme Court provided the second relevant limitation on the scope
of Rule 10b-5 in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.32 In Santa Fe minority
shareholders alleged that the majority shareholders had breached fiduciary
duties owed to the minority shareholders when the majority approved a
short form merger.3 3 The dissenting minority shareholders retained only the
appraisal rights to their stock as a result of the short form merger. 4 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the minority shareholders' complaint for failure to state a Rule 10b-5 claim

25. Id. at 734-55; see infra text accompanying notes 26-31 (discussing practical concerns
that Supreme Court expressed in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores).
26. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 734-35.
27. Id. at 739.
28. Id. at 742 and 746.
29. Id. at 742.
30. Id. at 748.
31. Id.at 755.
32. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
33. Id. at 467. A short form merger is a merger of a subsidiary corporation into a
parent corporation that occurs with the voting approval of neither parent nor subsidiary
corporation shareholders. HAMiLTO= , CORPORATION FNccE 509 (1984). Short form merger
procedures are typically only available when the parent corporation owns 90% or more of
the subsidiary's stock. Id. Parent corporations often use short form mergers to divest minority
stockholders in the subsidiary of the minority stockholders' stock ownership interests. Id. As
a result of a short form merger dissenting minority stockholders in the subsidiary retain only
rights to appraisal and cash payment for the value of their stock. Id.
34. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 466.
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because the plaintiffs had not alleged that the defendant shareholders had
engaged in any manipulative or deceptive activity in connection with the
short form merger.3" The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in reversing the district court's decision, found that the minority
shareholder's stated a valid Rule lOb-5 claim.36 The Second Circuit held
that a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the approval of a short
form merger was within the scope of Rule lOb-5 and that a Rule lOb-5
plaintiff need not allege that the defendant made material misrepresentations
37
or nondisclosures.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the Second Circuit,
found that the gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint was that the majority
shareholders had breached a duty to the minority shareholders to treat the
minority fairly.3 8 The Court held that a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, absent any deception,
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, does not violate Rule lOb-5. 3 9 The
Supreme Court noted that causes of action for breaches of fiduciary duties
were traditionally the subject of state corporate law, and that providing a
cause of action under Rule lOb-5 unduly might supplant state law. 40 The
Court determined that the language of Rule lob-5 should guide the Court's
interpretation of Rule lOb-5 in considering the case and that, because
Congress had not provided expressly for the application of Rule lob-5 to
conduct solely involving breaches of fiduciary duty, the extension of Rule
lOb-5 to cases exclusively concerning breaches of fiduciary duty was un4
merited. '
The Supreme Court decisions in Blue Chip Stamps and Santa Fe have
forced the federal courts to reconsider whether broker conversions of
customer property constitute acts of fraud, manipulation, or deception in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities to which Rule lOb-5
should apply.42 The federal courts have adopted three basic positions in
resolving questions of Rule lob-5 applicability to broker conversions of

35. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 391 F. Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 533 F.2d 1283, 1289 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. Id. at 1287.
38. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477.
39. Id. at 476.
40. Id. at 478-79.
41. Id.at 477.
42. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (holding that fraud,
manipulation, or deception by defendant must exist for plaintiff to state claim under Rule
lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1975) (holding that
plaintiff must be purchaser or seller of securities to achieve standing under Rule lOb-5). The
Blue Chip Stamps and Santa Fe decisions have forced the federal courts to reconsider the
applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions of customer property because the purchaseor-sale and fraud, manipulation, or deception requirements are not readily adaptable to
situations involving broker conversions of customer property. See infra notes 157-80 and
accompanying text (discussing how purchase-or-sale and fraud, manipulation, or deception
requirements apply to situations involving broker conversions of customer property).
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customer property. The permissive view allows customers to assert Rule
lOb-5 claims for any acts of conversion by brokers. 43 The strict view asserts
that customer claims based on broker conversion of the customer property
never are proper claims under Rule lOb-5. 44 The third view attempts to
distinguish among various acts of conversion, with the result that some
broker conversions of customer property fall within the scope of Rule4 10b5 while other conversions do not fall within the scope of Rule lOb-5. 1
In espousing, the permissive view, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit has chosen the most liberal of the three views regarding
46
the applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions of customer property.
47
In Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, a broker induced a customer to
4
engage the broker for the purpose of transacting in the options market. 1
The customer pledged corporate bonds to the broker as collateral for the
options transactions. 49 The customer retained authority over all trading
activity in his account.50 The relationship between the broker and the
customer deteriorated when the broker allegedly failed to execute transactions according to the customer's orders and made securities purchases that
the customer did not authorize. 5s Furthermore, when the customer decided
to terminate the customer's account with the broker, the broker allegedly
refused to return the customer's bonds unless the customer signed a release
absolving the brokerage firm from all liability. 2 The customer brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
claiming that the broker had violated Rule lob-5 by trading in excess of
the broker's delegated authority and by holding the customer's pledged
bonds contrary to the customer's order.53 The district court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 10b-5.4

43. See infra notes 46-62 and accompanying text (discussing permissive view of Rule
lOb-5 applicability to broker conversions of customer property).
44. See infra notes 63-95 and accompanying text (discussing strict view regarding
applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions of customer property).
45. See infra notes 96-138 and accompanying text (discussing view that attempts to
distinguish between various broker conversions in determining applicability of Rule lob-5 to
broker conversions of customer property).
46. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979) (adopting
permissive application of Rule 10b-5 to broker conversions of customer property).
47. 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979).
48. Id. at 1019.
49. Id.
50. Id. The customer plaintiff in Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben maintained a
nondiscretionary account with the defendant broker. Id. When the customer maintains a
nondiscretionary account, the customer does not delegate authority to the broker to trade
securities on the customer's behalf unless the customer gives the broker prior authorization.
See JAcoas, supra note 4, at § 212.01 n.6 (discretionary account involves delegation of authority
to broker to trade securities on behalf of customer).
51. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1020.
52. Id. at 1020-21.
53. Id. at 1026-27.
54. Id. at 1022. In Mansbach, the district court found that the plaintiff's claim that
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the district court, the Sixth Circuit found
the broker had engaged in unauthorized
converted the customer's bonds were both
The Mansbach court declared that brokers

are fiduciaries who owe a high degree of care to customers in managing
customer accounts. 5 6 The Sixth Circuit found that reckless trading in a
customer's account, contrary to the customer's wishes, is a manipulative7
and deceptive practice in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.1
The Sixth Circuit thus held that Rule lOb-5 applied to reckless unauthorized

trading in a customer's account.5 8 Furthermore, the Mansbach court noted

the broker had violated Rule lOb-5 by engaging in unauthorized trading was not within the
scope of Rule lob-5 because the broker had acted only negligently and Rule lOb-5 did not
apply to negligent conduct. Id. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976)
(Rule lOb-5 does not apply to negligent conduct). The district court also found that the
plaintiff's allegation that the broker had converted the plaintiff's bonds failed to state a claim
under Rule lOb-5 because the conversion was not in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1022. The district court's opinion is not officially reported.
Id. at 1019.
55. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1026-27.
56. Id. at 1026 (brokers are fiduciaries who owe high duty of care to customers in
managing customer accounts); see Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Rule
lob-5 imposes higher standards upon brokers than upon other persons who engage in securities
transactions), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764,
768-69 (2d Cir. 1964) (securities broker misdeeds may violate Rule lob-5 although same acts
would not violate Rule 10b-5 if nonbroker were involved). See generally JAcoBs, supra note
4, at § 210.01 (brokers held to higher standard than nonbrokers in judging whether broker
actions violate Rule IOb-5); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 871 (same); Langevoort, supra note 4, at
1280 (same).
57. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1026.
58. Id. (Rule lOb-5 applies to broker's unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary customer
account); see Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1520 (9th Cir.
1986) (unauthorized broker trading constitutes proper basis for claim under Rule lOb-5); Smoky
Greenhaw Cotton Co., Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274,
1277 (5th Cir. 1986) (unauthorized broker trading in nondiscretionary account is fraudulent
scheme to which Rule lOb-5 applies); Nye v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189,
1197 (8th Cir. 1978) (unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary account, although customer has
ratified broker trades, constitutes proper claim under Rule lOb-5). But see Brophy v. Redivo,
725 F.2d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984) (unauthorized trading alone does not support claim under
Rule lOb-5); Obrien v. Continental I. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 61 (7th Cir.
1979) (unauthorized broker trading in discretionary account does not constitute basis for claim
under Rule lOb-5); Pross v. Baird, Patrick & Co., 585 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(unauthorized broker trading in nondiscretionary account is not within scope of Rule lOb-5);
Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1318 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Rule lOb5 does not apply to unauthorized broker trading; plaintiff merely has claim for conversion or
breach of contract under state law); Cortlandt v. E.F. Hutton, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1, 4
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (unauthorized broker trading in discretionary account is basis for breach of
contract claim only, and Rule lOb-5 does not apply); Fein v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 137, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (mere allegation of unauthorized broker trading in nondiscretionary account is insufficient to state claim under Rule lOb-5); Wassel v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D. Md. 1977) (unauthorized broker trading does not
constitute basis for claim under Rule lOb-5; plaintiff has claim only for conversion or breach
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that the broker's refusal to return the customer's pledged bonds was a
misappropriation of the customer's property that was inherently fraudulent. 9
The Mansbach court found that the customer's initial pledge of the bonds
to the broker supplied the requisite purchase or sale for Rule 1Ob-5 applicability to the broker's act of conversion. 6° The Sixth Circuit thus implied
that any acts of conversion of customer property by brokers are inherently
fraudulent and, if in reckless disregard of the customers' interests, are
61
sufficient bases for a Rule lOb-5 claim.

of contract).
Several courts have found that Rule lOb-5 does not apply to unauthorized trading involving
discretionary accounts. See Obrien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54,
61 (7th Cir. 1979) (unauthorized broker trading in discretionary account does not constitute
basis for claim under Rule lOb-5); Cortlandt v. E.F. Hutton, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (unauthorized broker trading in discretionary account is basis for breach of contract
claim only, Rule lOb-5 does not apply). Unauthorized broker trading in discretionary accounts
is less egregious than unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary accounts because the customer
delegates authority to the broker in a discretionary account, while the customer gives the
broker authority to trade on behalf of the customer in a nondiscretionary account. See JACOBS,
supra note 4, at § 212.01 (describing nature of discretionary account). An allegation that the
broker traded customer securities without authority, therefore, is not proper when the customer
has a discretionary account because trading is not truly unauthorized. Id. The distinction
between discretionary and nondiscretionary accounts, therefore, is crucial to determining
whether Rule 10b-5 should apply to unauthorized trading. Id. Several federal courts have
failed to determine the nondiscretionary or discretionary nature of plaintiff customer accounts
in judging the applicability of Rule lOb-5 to unauthorized trading. See Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1986) (failing to determine nondiscretionary or discretionary nature of customer accounts in determining applicability of Rule lOb5 to unauthorized trading); Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1318
(E.D. Va. 1981) (same); Wassel v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.
Md. 1977) (same); infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (discussing relation of Rule lOb5 fraud, manipulation or deception requirement to unauthorized broker trading in nondiscretionary as opposed to discretionary accounts).
59. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1027-28; see United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262,
1265-66 (9th Cir. 1982) (broker's failure to disclose to customer that broker acted without
authority in using customer property makes broker conversion of customer property inherently
fraudulent), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 486 F. Supp. 622,
629 (E.D Wis. 1980) (broker conversion of customer funds constitutes fraudulent scheme to
which Rule lOb-5 applies), modified on other grounds, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co. v. Henricksen, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); infra
notes 98-109 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Kendrick). But see Bosio v.
Norbay Sec., Inc. 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (broker conversion of proceeds
from sale of customer securities involves no misrepresentation or fraud, and therefore, Rule
lOb-5 does not apply to broker conversion); Smith v. Chicago Corp., 566 F. Supp. 66, 69
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (broker conversion of customer funds does not involve fraud, and therefore,
Rule 10b-5 does not apply). See generally Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1256-57 n.43 (discussing
whether misappropriation or conversion of property is fraudulent).
60. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1029. A pledge of securities is a sale for the purposes of
satisfying the purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 554 n.2 (1982) (pledge of securities is sale); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975) (establishing purchase-or-sale requirement for Rule lOb5 standing).
61. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1027; see United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262, 1265-
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The Sixth Circuit's permissive view, which recognizes Rule lOb-5 applicability to broker conversion of customer property, is popular among

commentators, however, the permissive view does not have a wide following
among the federal courts. 62 In direct opposition to the Sixth Circuit's
permissive view is the strict view favored by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and the federal district courts within the
Second Circuit. In Pross v. Katz63, the defendant, an attorney and real
estate developer, agreed to manage the plaintiff's investment in a limited
partnership. 64 The defendant allegedly intended to convert the plaintiff's
interest in the limited partnership to the defendant's own use at the time
the defendant contracted with the plaintiff to manage the plaintiff's invest-

66 (9th Cir. 1982) (Rule lOb-5 applies to broker conversion of customer property), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 914 (1983); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 486 F. Supp. 622, 629 (E.D Wis. 1980) (broker
conversion of customer funds constitutes fraudulent scheme to which Rule 10b-5 applies),
modified on other grounds, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Smith, Barney,
Harris, Upham & Co. v. Henricksen, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981). But see Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1986) (Rule 10b-5 does not apply
to broker conversion of customer securities); Bold v. Simpson, 802 F.2d 314, 320-21 (8th Cir.
1986) (Rule lOb-5 does not apply to conversion or theft of securities); Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d
455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule lOb-5 does not apply to conversion or theft of securities by
fiduciary); Miller v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co. [Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 92,498, at 93,031 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Rule lOb-5 does not apply to broker conversion
of customer funds); Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc. 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(broker conversion of proceeds from sale of customer securities involves no misrepresentation
or fraud, and, therefore Rule lOb-5 does not apply to broker conversion); Smith v. Chicago
Corp., 566 F. Supp. 66, 69 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (broker conversion of customer funds does not
involve fraud, and, therefore, Rule lob-5 does not apply); Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer
98,772, at 93,920 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (broker conversion of
Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH)
customer securities is not proper basis for claim under Rule lOb-5); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Freedman, 443 F. Supp. 628, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (claim involving corporate conversion of
cash using sham securities transaction does not fall within scope of Rule lOb-5), aff'd, 594
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1978).
Several cases find that Rule lOb-5 does not apply to conversions and thefts of property
did not involve securities brokers as defendants. See Bold v. Simpson, 802 F.2d 314, 320-21
(8th Cir. 1986) (involving nonbroker defendant who reassigned to himself plaintiff's interest
in oil lease); Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 457 (2d Cir. 1986) (involving defendant attorney
and real estate developer who converted plaintiffs interest in limited partnership); Superintendent of Ins. v. Freedman, 443 F. Supp. 628, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (involving corporate
director defendants who misappropriated cash from corporation using sham securities transaction), aff'd, 594 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1978). Situations that do not implicate securities brokers
as defendants are distinguishable from situations that implicate brokers because Rule lob-5
imposes higher standards of conduct upon brokers. See supra note 56 and accompanying text
(discussing higher Rule lOb-5 standards for brokers than for nonbrokers).
62. See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 954-63 (Rule lOb-5 should apply to broker conversions
of customer property); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1279-83 (same); see also supra notes 5861 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court positions concerning applicability
of Rule lob-5 to broker conversions of customer property).
63. 784 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 457. An interest in a limited partnership is a security. SEC v. Holschuh, 694
F.2d 130, 137 (7th Cir. 1982); see JAcoas, supra note 4, at § 38.03(y) (examining status of
limited partnership interest as security for purposes of Rule lOb-5).
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ment.6 5 The defendant also represented to the plaintiff that the defendant
would manage the plaintiff's investments faithfully. 6 Despite the representations of good faith, however, the defendant allegedly procured through
fraudulent means blank signature pages from the plaintiff and used the
signatures to facilitate a transfer of the plaintiff's interest in the limited
partnership to the defendant. 67 The plaintiff brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.68 The plaintiff
asserted that the defendant had violated Rule 10b-5 when the defendant
represented to the plaintiff that the defendant would manage the plaintiff's
affairs faithfully, while the defendant actually intended to convert the
plaintiff's interest in the limited partnership. 69 The plaintiff also claimed
that the defendant had violated Rule 10b-5 when the defendant fraudulently
obtained the plaintiff's signature and used the signature to effect a transfer
of the plaintiffs interest in the limited partnership to the defendant without
a corresponding transfer of consideration to the plaintiff.70 The district
court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim under
Rule 10b-5.71
In considering the plaintiff's case on appeal from the district court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
plaintiff's allegations did not state a claim under Rule lOb-5. 72 Although
the case did not involve actions by a securities broker, the Second Circuit
found that the defendant was acting in a fiduciary capacity in managing
the plaintiff's investments. 73 The Second Circuit declared that the defendant's
misrepresentation that the defendant would manage the plaintiff's investments fairly gave rise only to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 74
Furthermore, the Second Circuit noted that the conversion or theft of the
plaintiff's securities did not state a Rule 10b-5 claim despite the defendant's
status as a fiduciary. 75 The Pross court held that the conversion of the
plaintiff's interest in the limited partnership did not constitute a purchase
65. Pross, 784 F.2d at 457.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 456.
69. Id. at 457.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 456. The district court in Pross found that the plaintiff's complaint stated
only a claim for breach of contract, and not a claim under Rule lOb-5. Id. The district court's
opinion is not officially reported. Id.
72. Id. at 459.
73. Id. The Pross court's determinations concerning the applicability of Rule lob-5 to
conversion of property by a fiduciary are relevant to questions concerning the applicability of
Rule lob-5 to conversion of property by brokers because securities brokers are fiduciaries. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing status of broker as fiduciary to customer).
74. Pross, 784 F.2d at 458; see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77
(1977) (claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not within scope of Rule lOb-5).
75. Pross, 784 F.2d at 459; see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (noting
conflicting federal court decisions concerning applicablity of Rule lOb-5 to conversion of
property by fiduciaries and brokers).
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or sale. 76 The Second Circuit, thus, refused to recognize the plaintiffs initial

76. Pross.784 F.2d at 459 (conversion of securities does not constitute a sale of securities
for purposes of Rule lOb-5); see Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d
1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1986) (theft or conversion of securities does not qualify as sale for
purposes of Rule lOb-5 standing); Bold v. Simpson, 802 F.2d 314, 320-21 (8th Cir. 1986) (Rule
lOb-5 does not apply to conversion or theft of securities because conversion or theft is not
sale); Miller v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc. [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 92,498, at 93,031 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (broker conversion of customer funds has no
connection to purchase or sale of securities); Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563,
1567 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (broker conversion of proceeds from sale of customer securities involves
no purchase or sale of securities, and, therefore, Rule lOb-5 does not apply to broker
conversion); Smith v. Chicago Corp., 566 F. Supp. 66, 69 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (no purchase or
sale of securities occurs when broker converts customer funds); Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH) 98,772, at 93,920 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (broker conversion
of customer securities does not involve exchange of securities, and therefore, no purchase or
sale occurs when broker converts customer securities); Superintendent of Ins. v. Freedman,
443 F. Supp. 628, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (corporate conversion of cash using sham securities
transaction is not within scope of Rule lOb-5 because no purchase or sale actually occured),
aff'd, 594 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262, 126566 (9th Cir. 1982) (broker conversion of customer funds in connection with customer pledge
of securities satisfies purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule 1Ob-5), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914
(1983); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1029 (6th Cir. 1979) (broker
conversion of customer securities that customer had pledged satisfies purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 486 F. Supp. 622, 629 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
(broker conversion of customer funds, coinciding with purchases of speculative securities for
customer's account, satisfies purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5), modifed on other
grounds, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co.
v. Henricksen, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981).
The purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5 poses a formidable barrier to claims
involving broker conversion of customer funds. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975) (refusing to recognize standing under Rule lOb-5 for non-purchasers
and non-sellers of securities). Unlike broker conversion of customer securities, broker conversion
of customer funds does not implicate necessarily any transfer of customer securities. Customers
might have funds on deposit with a broker, and, therefore, no sale of securities need occur
for the broker to misappropriate customer funds. Federal courts that hold that broker
conversion of customer funds is within the scope of Rule lOb-5 will connect the broker
conversion of funds to a prior or comtemporaneous purchase or sale of securities, thus
satisfying the purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lob-5. See United States v. Kendrick, 692
F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1982) (broker conversion of customer funds in connection with
prior customer pledge of securities satisfies purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 486 F. Supp. 622, 629 (E.D Wis.
1980) (broker conversion of customer funds, coinciding with purchases of speculative securities
for customer's account, satisfies purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5), modified on
other grounds, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham
& Co. v. Henricksen, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981). Federal courts that decline to hold that broker
conversion of customer funds is within the scope of Rule lOb-5, however, will not create a
causal nexus between broker conversions of cash and any prior or contemporaneous purchase
or sale transactions in the customer's account. See Miller v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham &
Co., Inc. [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,498, at 93,031 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(broker conversion of customer funds has no connection to purchase or sale of securities);
Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (broker conversion of
proceeds from sale of customer securities involves no purchase or sale of securities; sale
generating misappropriated proceeds does not provide requisite sale for Rule lob-5 purposes);
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purchase of the limited partnership interest as the requisite purchase for
Rule lOb-5 purposes. 77

In circumstances analogous to those in Pross, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether Rule 1Ob5 applied to a broker's pledge of a customer's securities.7" In First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon

& Co.,79 several banks retained the services of a broker to trade in government securities. 80 The banks purchased securities and left the securities on
deposit with the broker.8 ' The broker, although representing to the customer

banks that the securities were in separate accounts, pledged the customers'
securities to a third party lender as security for loans to the broker.82 The
customers brought suit in federal district court, claiming Rule lOb-5 violations, against the broker's accountants for the accountant's alleged involve83
ment in the broker's conversion of the customers' securities.
In addressing the plaintiffs' allegations, the district court in FirstFederal
refused to recognize the plaintiff customers' standing as purchasers or sellers
of securities.8

4

The district court found that although the broker's pledge

of the customers' securities was a sale for the purposes of Rule lOb-5, the
broker's pledge of the customers' securities was not attributable to the
plaintiff customers.85 The district court held that in order to have standing
Smith v. Chicago Corp., 566 F. Supp. 66, 69 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (no purchase or sale of securities
occurs when broker converts customer funds); see also infra notes 158-72 and accompanying
text (discussing application of purchase-or-sale requirement to broker conversions of customer
securities).
77. Pross, 784 F.2d at 459 (refusing to connect conversion of securities to prior purchase
of securities by plaintiff). The Pross court's refusal to consider the plaintiff's initial purchase
of securities as the requisite purchase or sale for Rule 10b-5 purposes directly conflicts with
the position of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben. See Mansbach, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979). In Mansbach, the
Sixth Circuit found that the customer's initial pledge of securities was sufficient to supply the
requisite purchase-or-sale to give the plaintiff standing for the broker conversion of the
customer's securities that occured approximately six months later. Id. at 1029. The Pross
court, however, refused to recognize the plaintiff's purchases of securities in 1981 as the
requisite purchases for Rule 10b-5 standing in an action concerning the defendant's conversion
of the plaintiff's securities in 1983 and 1984. Pross, 784 F.2d at 456-57.
78. See First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon &
Co., 629 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that Rule 10b-5 does not apply to broker
pledge of customer securities).
79. 629 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
80. Id. at 432.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel,
Dixon & Co., a separate action against the broker was settled before the plaintiffs' suit against
the accountants came before the district court. See Wichita Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Comark, 586 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (prior suit against broker, noting settlement of
plaintiff's claim).
84. First Federal, 629 F. Supp. at 439; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 751-55 (1975) (creating purchase-or-sale limitation on Rule lOb-5 standing).
85. First Federal, 629 F. Supp. at 439.
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under Rule lOb-5, the customer had to be a pledgor or pledgee of the
securities.16 The district court thus barred all customer claims under Rule
7
lOb-5 against a broker for unauthorized pledges of a customer's securities .
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
continued the Second Circuit trend of strict denial of customer claims under
Rule lOb-5 for broker conversions of customer property in Pross v. Baird,
8
Patrick & Co., Inc. (Baird).
" In Baird, a customer had established a
nondiscretionary securities trading account with the defendant broker.8 9 The
customer asserted that the broker had made purchases and sales in the
customer's account that the customer had not authorized and that the
unauthorized trading violated Rule lOb-5.90 The district court, in finding
that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under Rule 10b-5, did not focus on
the purchase or sale requirement, but rather upon the manipulation or
deception requirement of Rule lOb-5. 91 The Baird court found that unauthorized trading in a nondiscretionary account did not inherently involve
deception of the customer by the broker and, therefore, was not within the
scope of Rule 1Ob-5. 92 The district court opined that the plaintiff's allegations
93
stated only a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or breach of contract.

86. Id. (broker pledge of customer securities is not attributable to customer for purpose
of fulfilling purchase- or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5). But see United States v. Kendrick,
692 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1982) (broker pledge of customer securities is attributable to
customer), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); see also Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1519 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that broker pledge of customer
securities is attributable to customer, but also stating that customer did not have standing
under Rule lOb-5 as purchaser or seller unless customer was actual pledgor or pledgee of
securities).
87. First Federal,629 F. Supp. at 439 (Rule lob-5 does not apply to broker pledge of
customer securities). But see United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1982)
(broker pledge of customer securities is within scope of Rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
914 (1983); see also Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1519 n.2
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that broker pledge of customer 'securities is within scope of Rule lob5, but also stating that customer did not have standing under Rule lob-5 as purchaser or seller
unless customer was actual pledgor or pledgee of securities).
88. 585 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
89. Id. at 1458; see also supra note 50 (distinguishing between non-discretionary and
discretionary trading accounts).
90. Baird, 585 F. Supp. at 1458.
91. Id. at 1458-59; see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)
(establishing fraud, manipulation or deception requirement, which serves to restrict scope of
Rule lOb-5).
92. Baird, 585 F. Supp. at 1460 (broker unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary
account is not inherently deceptive); see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text
(discussing conflicting federal court positions concerning applicability of Rule lOb-5 to unauthorized trading).
93. Baird, 585 F. Supp. at 1460 (unauthorized trading implicates no Rule lob-5 claim;
plaintiff only has claim for breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty). In finding that
unauthorized trading does not fall within the scope of Rule lOb-5, the Baird court implied
that unauthorized trading claims were similar in nature to claims involving broker refusal to
execute trades that the customer had ordered. Id.; see Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
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The district court thus ruled that all claims involving unauthorized trading
were outside the scope of Rule 10b-5 unless a broker actively deceives a
customer by representing to the customer that trading in the customer's
4
account is authorized when the trading is actually unauthorized.
The decisions in Pross, First Federal, and Baird demonstrate the
hostility of Second Circuit courts to the application of Rule lOb-5 to broker
conversions of customer property.95 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, however, has been more flexible than the Second
Circuit, allowing Rule lOb-5 claims for some broker conversions of customer
property, but dismissing Rule lOb-5 claims for certain other broker conversions.9 6 The Ninth Circuit has attempted to distinguish among various acts
of conversion.9 In United States v. Kendrick,98 a broker appealed to the
Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1518 (9th Cir. 1986) (broker's refusal to execute trades that customer
orders broker to make does not give rise to Rule lob-5 claim; rather, customer only has claim
for breach of fiduciary duty); Forkin v. Rooney Pace, Inc., [Current Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,982, at 94,819-20 (8th Cir. 1986) (broker refusal to rescind sale on customer
order involves only breach of contract claim, and not Rule lob-5 claim); Shemtob v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (broker's failure to sell securities, contrary
to agreement with customer that broker would sell securities in customer's account, involves
only breach of contract claim, and not Rule lob-5 claim); Smith v. Chicago Corp., 566 F.
Supp. 66, 69-70 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Rule 10b-5 does not apply to broker refusal to execute trades
that customer requested); Zerman v. Jacobs, 510 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (broker
sale of customer securities, contrary to agreement with customer not to sell, does not implicate
Rule lOb-5; customer has only breach of contract claim); Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick,
Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1318 (E.D. Va. 1981) (broker refusal to sell on customer's order is
breach of contract claim only). Unauthorized broker trading in a customer's nondiscretionary
account, however, involves deception. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (discussing
deceptive nature of unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary account). Broker refusal to execute
customer-ordered trades, however, does not involve deception. See cases cited supra (finding
broker refusal to trade securities on customer's order not deceptive act within scope of Rule
lOb-5). When a broker refuses to execute a trade that the customer has ordered, the customer
is aware of the status of the customer's account at all times. Unauthorized trading, in contrast,
involves broker activities of which the customer has no knowledge as the activity takes place.
Unauthorized trading thus implies deception of the customer because the broker fails to disclose
to the customer that the broker is trading in the customer's account without authority. See
infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (discussing deception involved in unauthorized
trading in nondiscretionary account). Unlike broker refusal to execute customer-ordered trades,
unauthorized trading should not give rise only to a breach of contract or breach of fiduciary
duty claim, but should implcate a Rule lob-5 claim. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text (discussing conflicting federal court decisions concerning applicability of Rule lob-5 to
unauthorized trading).
94. Baird, 585 F. Supp. at 1460.
95. See Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986) (Rule lOb-5 does not apply to
theft or conversion of secrities by fiduciary); First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim,
Appel, Dixon & Co., 629 F. Supp. 427, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Rule lob-5 does not apply to
unauthorized broker pledge of customer securities); Pross v. Baird, Patrick & Co., 585 F.
Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Rule lob-5 does not apply to unauthorized broker trading).
96. See infra notes 98-138 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit cases
concerning the applicabilty of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions).
97. See infra notes 98-138 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit cases
concerning applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversion of customer property).
98. 692 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Ninth Circuit his conviction in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Cailfornia for violations of Rule lOb-5. 99 The broker
allegedly had converted funds from customer accounts with a third party
broker by using unauthorized drafts on the customer accounts.1'° The broker
also allegedly had procured loans from the third party broker using as
collateral customer securities that the customers had pledged to the third
party broker.' 01 Furthermore, the defendant broker allegedly told the customers that the withdrawals of cash were for the purpose of purchasing
securities, and the broker did not disclose to the customers that the broker
2
had used the customers' securities as collateral for loans to the broker. a
In affirming the broker's conviction, the Ninth Circuit found that both
the broker's conversion of the customers' cash and the broker's use of the
customers' securities as collateral for loans to the broker violated Rule 10b5.113 The Kendrick court declared that the pledge of securities to the third
party broker supplied the requisite purchase or sale for Rule lOb-5 purposes.101 The Ninth Circuit noted that the broker had not made a new
pledge of the customers' securities in procuring the loan from the third
party broker but that the absence of a new pledge was irrelevant. 105 The
Kendrick court held that a sale occured when, as a result of the loan, the
defendant broker gave the third party broker an additional interest in the
1 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit opined that the acts
customers' securities. "1
of conversion were fraudulent.: 7 The Kendrick court determined that the
defendant's failure to disclose that the defendant was acting without authority in converting the customers' property was fraudulent. 08 The Kendrick
court thus ruled that Rule lOb-5 applied to the broker conversion of
customer cash, which was essentially theft, and to the broker's unauthorized
9
use of customer securities as collateral for loans to the broker.'

99. Id. at 1263. No reported information exists concerning the findings of law that
the district court in Kendrick made during the trial and pursuant to the conviction of the defendant. Id.
100. Id. at 1264.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1264-65.
103. Id. at 1265-66; see supra notes 59-61 & 76 and accompanying text (discussing
conflicting federal court decisions concerning applicability of Rule 10b-5 to broker conversion
of customer funds); supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal
court decisions concerning applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker pledge of customer securities).
104. Kendrick, 692 F.2d at 1265 (broker pledge of customer securities is attributable to
customer for purposes of satisfying purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5); see supra
notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court decisions concerning
attribution of broker pledge of customer securities to customer).
105. Kendrick, 692 F.2d at 1265.
106. Id.
107. See id.(broker conversion of customer property is inherently fraudulent); see also
supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent nature of broker conversions of
customer property).
108. Kendrick, 692 F.2d at 1265-66.
109. Id. at 1265.
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Despite finding in Kendrick that broker conversion of customer property

was within the scope of Rule lOb-5, the Ninth Circuit has not been consistent
in allowing Rule 10b-5 claims involving broker conversions of customer
property. In Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Vigman," 0 the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC),"' as subrogee to broker
customer claims, 12 alleged that the defendant brokers had converted customer property in a number of ways." 3 The defendant brokers, aided by
corporate and individual defendants, allegedly had engaged in a scheme to
manipulate the stock prices of several corporations." 4 The exposure of the
scheme led to the insolvency of the brokerage firms, and upon liquidation

of the brokerage firms, the trustee found that customer securities and cash
were missing.15 SIPC alleged that the defendant brokers had stolen customer16
securities and cash and had pledged customer securities to broker creditors.
SIPC also alleged that the brokers had conducted unauthorized trading in

customer accounts. 1 7 The United States District Court for the Central
District of California dismissed SIPC's complaint for failure to state a claim
under Rule lOb-5." 8
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

held that simple conversions and thefts of customer property were not within

110. 803 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1986).
111. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1970) (amended
1978, 1980). The Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) created the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC), a nonprofit membership corporation, to provide protection to
broker customers in the event of broker insolvency. Id. § 78ccc. SIPC membership consists
of nationally registered securities brokers and dealers. Id. § 78ccc(2)(a). SIPA requires SIPC
to establish a fund to satisfy customer claims against the insolvent broker through assessments
upon SIPC members. Id. § 78ddd. The SIPC fund is supplemented by up to $1 billion that
SIPC may borrow from the United States Treasury. Id. § 78ddd(f)-(h). A proceeding under
SIPA involves liquidation of the insolvent broker. Id. § 78fff(a). A SIPC trustee satisfies
customer claims against the defendant broker for the value of the customer's security and cash
positions that the broker was supposed to have on hand at the time the SIPA liquidation
proceeding commenced. Id. §§ 78fff, 78fff-3. SIPC satisfies customer claims to the greatest
extent possible by using available assets of the broker. Id. § 78fff-2(c). To the extent that
broker assets are insufficient, SIPC disburses cash or market-purchased securities to satisfy
customer claims. Id. §§ 78fff-2(d), 78fff-3(a). SIPC may not advance more than $500,000 of
SIPC funds to cover customer claims for securities on deposit with the broker, and no more
than $100,000 to satisfy customer losses of cash. Id. § 78fff-3(a). To the extent that SIPC
satisfies customer claims out of SIPC funds, SIPC is subrogee to any related claims that the
customers have against the insolvent broker or third parties. Id. § 78fff-3(a).
112. See supra note 111 (discussing nature of SIPC subrogation rights).
113. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1519 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. Id.at 1515.
115. Id.

116. Id.at 1519.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1515. The district court in Vigman held that SIPC, and therefore the broker
customers, lacked standing under Rule lOb-5 as purchasers or sellers of securities. Id. at 1516.
The district court's opinion is not officially reported. Id. at 1515.
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the scope of Rule lOb-5."19 The Vigman court determined that the purchase-

or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5 was not satisfied. 2 0 The Ninth Circuit,
however, made conflicting statements concerning the Rule 10b-5 status of
the broker pledges of customer securities.' 2 ' While stating that the customers
lacked standing under Rule lOb-5 for the broker pledges of customer

securities because the customers themselves were not pledgors of the securities, the Ninth Circuit also noted that unauthorized broker pledges of
customer securities were attributable to the customer for the purpose of

meeting the purchase-or-sale requirement.'2 The Ninth Circuit additionally
found that Rule lOb-5 applied to unauthorized trading in customer ac-

counts.123 The Vigman court found that the brokers' unauthorized trading
in customer accounts was attributable to the customer, thus fulfilling the
purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5. 24 The Vigman court noted that
allowing Rule lOb-5 claims for unauthorized trading would not implicate

any of the practical concerns that the United States Supreme Court discussed
in Blue Chip Stamps.12Standing in apparent contradiction to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Vigman concerning unauthorized trading, however, is the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Brophy v. Redivo.' 26 In Brophy a customer granted authority to

119. Id.; see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal
court positions concerning applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions and thefts of
customer property).
120. Vigman, 803 F.2d at 1519; see supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing
status of conversion of securities as purchase or sale for purposes of Rule lob-5 standing).
121. Vigman, 803 F.2d at 1519.
122. Id.; see supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing federal court decisions
concerning attribution of broker pledge of customer securities to customer for purposes of
satisfying purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5).
123. Vigman, 803 F.2d at 1519.
124. Id. Whether unauthorized trading by a broker should be attributable to the customer
generally is not an issue in Rule lob-5 unauthorized trading cases; federal courts uniformly
assume that the customer has standing as purchaser or seller for broker trades conducted in
the customer's account. See Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274, 1277 (5th Cir. 1986) (assuming, without expressly stating, that
customer has standing under Rule lob-5 as purchaser or seller of securities for unauthorized
trading by broker); Brophy v. Redivo, 725 F.2d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Obrien v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 61 (7th Cir. 1979) (same); Mansbach
v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979) (same); Nye v. Blyth, Eastman,
Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); Pross v. Baird, Patrick & Co., 585
F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 1303, 1318 (E.D. Va. 1981) (same); Cortlandt v. E.F. Hutton, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1, 4
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same); Fein v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 137, 142-43
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Wassel v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.
Md. 1977) (same).
125. Vigman, 803 F.2d at 1520; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 735-55 (1975) (enumerating practical reasons for denying Rule lob-5 standing to nonpurchasers and nonsellers of securities); supra text accompanying notes 25-31 (discussing the
practical reasons for denying standing to non-purchasers or sellers in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores).
126. 725 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1984).
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a broker to trade on any positions in the customer's nondiscretionary
account that became "dangerous" while the customer was away on a onemonth vacation. 127 Upon returning from vacation, the customer noted a
number of trades in the customer's account that the customer felt were
unauthorized. 128 Six months after the discovery, the customer asserted that
the broker violated Rule lOb-5 when the broker engaged in unauthorized
trading in the customer's account. 129 The United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, in directing a verdict for the defendant, found that
unauthorized trading did not violate Rule lOb-5.' 30 Affirming the district
court's decision, the Ninth Circuit asserted that unauthorized trading alone
did not support a claim under Rule lOb-5 . 31 The Brophy court held that
the customer's Rule lOb-5 claim failed because the unauthorized trading did
not involve fraud, manipulation, or deception and because the customer
failed to show that the broker acted in reckless disregard for the customer's
interests. 3 2 Significant to the Brophy court's decision were the facts that
the customer had profited from the unauthorized trading and that the
customer had failed to complain about the unauthorized trading for six

months. 133
As a result of the Ninth Circuit's opinions in Kendrick, Vigman, and
Brophy, the law in the Ninth Circuit under Rule lOb-5 concerning broker
conversions is unclear.134 The Ninth Circuit's attempts to distinguish between
various acts of conversion have been unsuccessful.13 The holdings in Vigman
and Kendrick conflict on the question of Rule lOb-5 applicability to simple
conversions and thefts of customer property. 136 The Ninth Circuit's opinions
in Vigman and Brophy conflict on the question of Rule 10b-5 applicability
to unauthorized broker trading in customer accounts. 37 Finally, the Ninth

127. Id. at 1221.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1220.
131. Id.; see supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court
decisions concerning applicability of Rule lOb-5 to unauthorized trading).
132. Brophy, 725 F.2d at 1220-21.
133. Id. at 1221.
134. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1519-20 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Rule lob-5 does not apply to broker theft or conversion of customer securities,
but Rule lOb-5 applies to unauthorized broker pledge of customer securities and to unauthorized
broker trading); Brophy v. Redivo, 725 F.2d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984) (unauthorized trading
alone does not support Rule lOb-5 claim); United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262, 1265-66
(9th Cir. 1982) (Rule lob-5 applies to broker conversion of customer funds and to unauthorized
broker pledge of customer securities), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
135. See supra notes 96-133 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit decisions
concerning the applicability of Rule lob-5 to broker conversion of customer property).
136. Compare Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1519 (9th
Cir. 1986) (broker conversion or theft of customer property is not within scope of Rule lob5); with United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1982) (broker conversion
of customer property is within scope of Rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
137. Compare Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1520 (9th
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Circuit's ruling in Vigman is internally inconsistent on the applicability of
Rule lOb-5 to broker pledges of customer securities.' 38
In addition to the confusion in the Ninth Circuit conceming the applicabililty of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions of customer property, a conflict
exists between the Sixth Circuit and the Second Circuit.' 3 9 The Sixth Circuit's
permissive view, which allows Rule lOb-5 claims for all types of broker
conversion, directly opposes the Second Circuit's strict view, which rejects
all Rule lOb-5 claims involving broker conversion. 4 The existing conflict
among federal courts demands a uniform resolution in order to eliminate
confusion concerning the applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversion
of customer property. A desirable resolution of the confusion would provide
that Rule 10b-5 apply to broker thefts and misappropriations of securities
from customer accounts.14' Rule lOb-5 also should apply to broker pledges
of customer securities. 42 Finally, Rule lOb-5 should apply to unauthorized
broker trading in customers' nondiscretionary trading accounts. 43 The permissive view, applying Rule lob-5 to broker conversion of customer property, is thus more desirable than the strict view.' 44
An underlying premise to the superiority of the permissive view is the
impropriety of attempts to distinguish among various broker conversions of
customer property.' 45 The confusion that the Ninth Circuit has created in
attempting to distinguish among various acts of conversion demonstrates
the difficulty in making distinctions. 46 A broker's pledge of a customer's
securities essentially involves a broker's unauthorized use of customer prop-

Cir. 1986) (broker unauthorized trading is within scope of Rule lOb-5); with Brophy v. Redivo,
725 F.2d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984) (Rule lOb-5 does not apply to broker unauthorized
trading).
138. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1519 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that broker pledge of customer securities is not within scope of Rule lOb-5, but
also noting that customer has claim under Rule lOb-5 for broker pledge of customer securities).
139. See supra notes 46-95 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting positions of
Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit concerning applicability of Rule 10b-5 to broker conversions
of customer property).
140. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's permissive
view regarding applicability of Rule lob-5 to broker conversion of customer property); supra
notes 63-95 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's strict view regarding applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversion of customer property).
141. See infra notes 145-203 and accompanying text (providing support for Rule lob-5
applicability to broker thefts and misappropriations of customer securities).
142. See infra notes 145-203 and accompanying text (providing support for Rule lob-5
applicability to broker pledges of customer securities).
143. See infra notes 145-203 and accompanying text (providing support for Rule lob-5
applicability to unauthorized broker trading in customer nondiscretionary trading accounts).
144. See supra notes 46-95 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of strict and
permissive views concerning Rule lOb-5 applicability to broker conversions of customer property).
145. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why distinguishing
among various acts of conversion by brokers is improper).
146. See supra notes 96-138 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's attempts
to distinguish among various acts of conversion in determining applicability of Rule lOb-5).
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erty. 147 No benefit accrues to the customer as a result of the broker's
pledge. 148 Similarly, a broker's unauthorized trading in a customer's non149
discretionary account involves the unauthorized use of customer property.
In circumstances involving unauthorized trading, the customer receives consideration for which the customer did not bargain.5 0 When a broker steals
or misappropriates customer securities, the broker takes and uses customer
property without authority and without giving consideration to the customer. 51 Furthermore, each act of conversion directly interferes with the
customer's interests.

152

The broker's pledge violates the customer's interest

in preserving the value and integrity of the customer's securities. 53 Unauthorized trading in a customer's nondiscretionary account violates the customer's interest in maintaining control over transactions affecting the
customer's account.

54

Theft and misappropriation violate the customer's

basic property interests.'

Unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary ac-

counts, pledges of customer securities, and thefts and misappropriations of
customer securities, thus, each involve unauthorized use of customer prop-

erty, for no consideration, or for unbargained-for consideration, and are
acts contrary to customer interests.156 In judging the applicabilty of Rule
10b-5, therefore, distinctions between acts of conversion are improper. The
federal courts, therefore, uniformly should apply, or refuse to apply, Rule
10b-5 to broker conversions of customer property.
In determing whether or not Rule 10b-5 should apply to broker con-

version of customer property, however, federal courts have struggled with
the fraud, manipulation, or deception requirement and with the purchaseor-sale requirement.Y7 In addressing the purchase-or-sale requirement, federal courts have questioned whether a customer has standing under Rule
10b-5 as a purchaser or seller for transactions that a broker conducts. 5
147. See PROSSER, supra note 6, at 90 (conversion involves defendant's exercise of
dominion or control over property in manner inconsistent with rights of property's owner;
thus, pledge of property without authority is conversion).
148. Cf. id. (conversion involves transfer or use of property without corresponding
consideration flowing to property owner).
149. See id. (unauthorized use of property is conversion, and broker unauthorized trading,
therefore, is conversion).
150. Cf. id. (unauthorized use of property is conversion and involves unilateral action by
defendant).
151. See id. (theft of property is conversion).
152. See id. (conversion involves exercise of dominion or control over property that is
inconsistent with property owner's rights).
153. Cf. id. at 96 (unauthorized pledge of property is conversion).
154. Cf. id. at 90 (unauthorized use of property is conversion).
155. Cf. id. (theft of property is conversion).
156. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (discussing characterization of
unauthorized trading, unauthorized pledges and thefts of securities as acts of conversion).
157. See infra notes 159-86 and accompanying text (discussing application of purchaseor-sale and fraud, manipulation or deception requirements to broker conversions of customer
property).
158. See infra notes 159-72 and accompanying text (discussing application of purchaseor-sale requirement to broker conversions of customer property).
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Under Blue Chip Stamps, if the Rule lOb-5 plaintiff is not a purchaser or
seller of securities, the plaintiff does not have a Rule lob-5 claim. 15 9 The
status, however, of the plaintiff customer as a purchaser or seller of securities
in unauthorized trading cases is not an issue.'l 0 Federal courts uniformly
attribute the broker's transactions in the customer's account to the customer,
thus satisfying the purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5. 61 In cases
involving broker pledges of customer securities, however, federal courts
62
have questioned the customer's status as purchaser or seller of securities.
All broker transactions involving customer property should be attributable
to the customer for the purposes of fulfilling the purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lob-5. The customer's property is the subject of the broker's
transactions and, therefore, the customer is a party to the broker's dispositions of the customer's property even though the customer has no knowledge of the transactions. Furthermore, as the customer's agent in managing
the customer's investments, the broker acts on behalf of the customer63
whenever the broker performs any act involving the customer's property.
The failure to attribute the broker's actions concerning the customer's
property to the customer, therefore, constitutes an artificial restriction upon
the scope of Rule lob-5.
In addition to the problem regarding the attribution of broker transactions to the customer, the purchase-or-sale requirement is not readily
adaptable to the application of Rule lob-5 to broker thefts or misappropriations of customer securities.' 64 A broker theft or misappropriation of
customer securities is a transfer of the customer's property without consideration. 65 Because a sale for Rule lOb-5 purposes does not necessarily entail
consideration flowing to the seller, federal courts should characterize broker
thefts of customer securities as sales.1 6 Furthermore, broker pledges of

159. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727 (1975) (plaintiff
has no standing under Rule lOb-5 unless plaintiff is purchaser or seller of securities).

160.

See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing attribution of broker

trades to customer for purposes of satisfying purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5 in

unauthorized trading situations).
161. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing attribution of broker
trades to customer for purposes of fulfilling purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lob-5 in

unauthorized trading situations).
162. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court
positions concerning attribution of broker pledge of customer securities to customer for

purposes of satisfying purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5).
163.

See

JACOBS,

supra note 4, at § 210 (broker is customer's agent and fiduciary with

respect to management of customer's account).
164. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing status of broker conversion
or theft as purchase-or-sale for purposes of Rule lob-5 standing).
165. See JAcoBs, supra note 4, at § 116.02 n.10 (theft of securities is sale without
consideration).
166. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (transfer of
securities for worthless consideration is sale for purposes of Rule lOb-5 standing); Int'l Controls

Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir.) (no consideration need flow to seller for sale
to occur under Rule 10b-5), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d
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customer securities are basically thefts of all or a part of the value of the
customer's securities. 67 When a broker pledges a customer's securities, the
broker impairs the value of the customer's securities without giving corresponding consideration to the customer. 6 Because a pledge of securities is
a sale, 169 and because a broker pledge of customer securities must be

attributable to the customer,170 the broker pledge of customer securities
fulfills the purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule 10b-5.7

1

Because a broker

pledge is a theft of the value to the customer of securities as collateral, a
broker theft or misappropriation of customer securities likewise should
satisfy the purchase-or-sale requirement. Due to the attribution of broker
conversions to the customer and the classification of broker thefts of
customer securities as a sale, broker conversions of customer property fulfill
the purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5. 1 2

The purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule 10b-5, however, exists in
conjunction with the fraud, manipulation, or deception requirement.'7 A
plaintiff must meet both requirements to state a valid claim under Rule
lOb-5,. 74 A broker, however, deceives a customer when the broker converts
customer property because the broker fails to disclose to the customer that
the broker is using the customer's property without authorization. 75 Moreover, the broker has a fiduciary duty to the customer to disclose material

information to the customer regarding the management of the customer's
investment account. 76 The position of trust that the broker occupies inherently implies a representation to the customer that the broker will manage

872, 876 & 881 (5th Cir. 1970) (transfer of securities for no consideration is sale); Murphey
v. Hillwood Villa Assoc., 411 F. Supp. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (no consideration need flow
to seller for sale to occur under Rule lOb-5); see also JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 38.02(b)
(broker theft of customer securities should constitute sale for purposes of Rule lOb-5 standing).
167. See JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 213 (broker pledge of customer securities is misappropriation or theft of customer property).
168. See id. (broker pledge of customer securities involves taking of customer property
without consideration to customer).
169. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing status of pledge of securities
as sale for purposes of Rule lob-5 standing).
170. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court
positions concerning attribution of broker pledge of customer securities to customer for
purposes of satisfying purchase-or-sale requirement of Rule lOb-5).
171. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of Rule lob5 to broker pledge of customer securities).
172. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (discussing status of broker theft of
customer securities as sale of securities for purposes of Rule lOb-5 standing).
173. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing elements of Rule lOb-5 claim).
174. See supra notes 15-42 and accompanying text (discussing purchase-or-sale requirement
and fraud, manipulation, or deception requirement).
175. See United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1982) (broker use
of customer property without authority and without disclosure of lack of authority is deceptive),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
176. See Jacobs, Impact of Rule 10b-5, supra note 3, at 871-81 (broker is fiduciary of
customer and has duty to customer to disclose material information relevant to management
of customer's account).
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the customer's account in good faith. 17 7 A conversion of customer property,

17
therefore, necessarily involves a broker's misrepresentation of good faith.
79
Broker
Broker conversions of customer property, therefore, are deceptive.
conversions thus satisfy the fraud, manipulation, or deception requirement
of Rule lOb-5.1 0
In determining the applicablity of Rule lob-5 to broker conversions of
customer property, federal courts most often contend with the fraud,
manipulation, or deception requirement of Rule lob-5 in cases of unauProblems arise because federal courts often fail to
thorized trading.'
distinguish between allegations of unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary
accounts and allegations of unauthorized trading in discretionary accounts. 82
Trading in discretionary accounts is not deceptive, absent churning,8 3 because the customer has delegated authority to the broker to make investment
decisions.'" The broker, therefore, cannot deceive the customer because no

177. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943) (broker, by
taking customer business, impliedly represents to customer that broker will deal with customer
fairly), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). The implied representation that a broker will deal
with customers fairly is termed the "shingle theory". See JACOBS, supra note 4, at §210.03
(describing shingle theory); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 876-81 (same); Langevoort, supra note 4,
at 1280 (same). The term "shingle theory" derives from the concept that merely by going into
business as a broker, "hanging out his shingle", a broker represents to customers that the
broker will deal with customers fairly. See JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 210.03 (describing
derivation of term "shingle theory"); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 876 (same). The shingle theory
is an extremely broad basis for the establishment of fraud or deception in connection with
broker management of customer accounts because any unfair dealing with the customer involves
a misrepresentation or deception of the customer under Rule lOb-5. See JACOBS, supra note
4, at § 210.03 (describing breadth of shingle theory); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 876-81 (same).
178. See JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 213 (broker conversions involve misrepresentation
by broker because conversions are not consistent with representation of good faith dealing
that broker makes to customer).
179. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court
decisions concerning fraud, manipulation, or deception involved in broker conversion of
customer property).
180. See supra notes 59 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court
decisions concerning fraud, manipulation, or deception involved in broker conversion of
customer property).
181. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing application of fraud,
manipulation, or deception requirement to unauthorized trading cases).
182. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which federal courts
have failed to determine or to consider nondiscretionary or discretionary nature of customer
accounts in determining applicability of Rule lob-5 to unauthorized broker trading).
183. See e.g. Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1984)
(churning violates Rule lOb-5); Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir.
1981) (same); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
Churning involves excessive trading in a customer account for the purpose of generating broker
commissions and contrary to the customer's investment objectives. See JACOBS, supra note 4,
at § 212.01 (discussing churning as basis for claim under Rule lOb-5); Jacobs, supra note 3,
at 929-36 (same); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1247, 1281 (same).
184. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between discretionary
and nondiscretionary account).
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broker would have a duty to disclose.
unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary
to disclose a lack of authority'8 - and,
nondiscretionary accounts is deceptive. 8 6

The purchase-or-sale requirement and the fraud, manipulation, or deception requirement of Rule lob-5 create the primary barriers to the applicability of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions of customer property.8 7 The

practical concerns articulated in the Supreme Court's decisions in Blue Chip
Stamps and Santa Fe, however, provide general policy-oriented restrictions
upon the scope of Rule lOb-5. ss Allowing Rule lOb-5 claims for broker

conversions of customer property would have no serious practical consequences." 9 The federal courts can determine damages in broker conversion
cases with reasonable certainty. 90 Customers would receive the value of

converted securities or the amounts needed to restore customer accounts to
reflect only authorized trading. 9' In situations involving a broker pledge of
customer securities, the customer should receive the amount of any losses

directly related to the broker's impairment of the customer's security interest. 192 Moreover, in broker conversion situations, a Rule lOb-5 plaintiff's
case rests on objectively verifiable facts.

93

The plaintiff's allegation of

broker conversion involves specific transactions. Thefts, pledges, and unauthorized trades are discrete events. A customer, therefore, would not base

185. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing broker's duty to disclose lack
of authority when broker converts customer property).
186. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting federal court
decisions concerning deception involved in unauthorized trading in nondiscretionary accounts).
187. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing status of purchase-or-sale
requrement and fraud, manipulation, or deception requirement as primary barriers to application of Rule 10b-5 to broker conversions of customer property).
188. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (practical problems involved
in recognition of breach of fiduciary duty as within scope of Rule lOb-5 demand that no Rule
lOb-5 claim can exist absent fraud, manipulation, or deception); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735-55 (1975) (practical problems inherent in recognition of standing
under Rule 10b-5 for nonpurchasers and nonsellers of securities demand denial of standing
under Rule lob-5 to nonpurchasers and nonsellers).
189. See infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text (discussing lack of practical problems
involved in application of Rule 10b-5 to broker conversion of customer property).
190. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-35 (1975) (conjectural
or speculative recovery is undesirable in Rule lOb-5 actions); supra note 26 and accompanying
text (noting that determination of damages was concern of Supreme Court in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores).
191. See JAcoBs, supra note 4, at § 260.03[c][vii][R] (remedy to Rule lob-5 plaintiff for
claim involving defendant's unauthorized use of property is money damages sufficient to place
customer in position that customer would have occupied had defendant not acted without
authority).
192. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir. 1979)
(noting plaintiff's damages relating to broker's pledge of customer's securities).
193. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-46 (1975) (noting
that Rule lOb-5 violations resting upon speculative and unverifiable fact allegations are
improper).
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his Rule lOb-5 claim upon speculative allegations of the customer's action
if the broker had not engaged in wrongdoing. 94 Furthermore, the potential
class of plaintiffs who might allege broker conversions is not limitless
because a plaintiff would not have a Rule 10b-5 claim unless the plaintiff
could allege specific acts of conversion affecting the plaintiff's property. 95
Finally, the application of Rule lob-5 to broker conversions of customer
property would not unduly supplant state law. 96 Regulation of securities
brokers is largely the concern of federal legislation, not of state tort law. 97
The application of Rule lob-5 to broker conversions of customer property
thus does not create practical problems that would justify the exclusion of
broker conversion claims from the scope of Rule lob-5.
The final and most basic question in determining the scope of Rule
lob-5 is whether the application of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions of
customer property serves the purposes of Rule lob-5. 98 Although the
application of Rule 10b-5 to broker conversions requires a liberal interpretation of the language of Rule lOb-5, the federal courts have stated consistently that a flexible application of Rule 10b-5 is proper when the
application serves the purposes of Rule lob-5. 99 One purpose of the federal
securities laws is to foster honesty and fair dealing in every facet of the
securities industry. 2° Due to a broker's position of trust and importance in
upholding the integrity of securities markets, a broker must meet an exceptionally high ethical standard in performing his duties. 20' One of the purposes
of Rule lOb-5 is to enforce high ethical standards upon brokers. 20 2 Broker
194. See id. at 734 (plaintiff's allegation that plaintiff would have purchased securities
absent defendant's wrongdoing is improper basis for Rule lob-5 claim).
195. See id. at 747-48 (stating that Rule lOb-5 should not apply to situations that
potentially might involve limitless class of plaintiffs).
196. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (Rule lob-5 claim
that unduly would supplant state corporate lav is improper).
197.

See N. WOLFSON, R. PnILPs & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DALERS AN

SECURIrIS MARK=rs 1.01 (1985) (federal law dominates regulation of brokers; state law is
merely supplementary to pervasive scheme of federal regulation); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 872
(same).
198. See JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 6 (Rule lOb-5 should apply to only those situations
when Rule lob-5 applicability serves purposes underlying Rule lOb-5).
199. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (Rule 10b5 is "catchall" fraud provision and is liberally construed); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1977) (Rule lOb-5 should be construed liberally, not technically and
restrictively); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (provisions of Securities Exchange
Act should be broadly construed to effectuate remedial purposes). See generally JACOBS, supra
note 4, at § 7 (discussing interpretation of Rule lOb-5).
200. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (federal securities laws are
intended to foster honesty and fair dealing in all facets of securities industry).
201. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing exceptionally high standards
of conduct applying to brokers under Rule 10b-5).
202. See, e.g., Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (one purpose
of Rule lob-5 is to foster high standards of business ethics in securities industry); United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7, 14
(6th Cir. 1980) (same). See generally JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 6.06 (discussing promotion of
high ethical standards in securities industry as purpose of Rule 10b-5).
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conversions of customer property are inherently dishonest, unfair, and
unethical practices. 2°3 The application of Rule lob-5 to broker conversions
of customer property, therefore, advances the objectives of Rule lOb-5 by
promoting broker honesty, integrity, and fair dealing with customers.
The law concerning the applicability of Rule lob-5 to broker conversions
of customer property is conflicting and inconsistent. 2 4 The uniform application of Rule lOb-5 to a wide variety of broker conversions of customer
property is the proper resolution to the current conflict among the federal
courts. Distinguishing between various acts of conversion by brokers in
determining Rule lOb-5 applicability is improper because unauthorized broker trading, unauthorized broker pledges, and broker thefts of customer
securities are substantially similar acts. 205 A liberal construction of Rule lob5 allows broker conversions to satisfy the purchase-or-sale requirement and
the fraud, manipulation, or deception requirement of Rule lOb-5. 206 Permitting Rule lOb-5 claims based upon allegations of broker conversions of
customer property will not create the kind of practical problems in litigation
about which the Supreme Court has expressed concern. 207 The applicability
of Rule lOb-5 to broker conversions will further the objectives of Rule lOb5 by promoting high ethical standards for brokers. 20 Rule lOb-5, thus,
should apply to broker pledges, thefts, and misappropriations of customer
securities. 20 9 Rule lob-5 also should apply to broker unauthorized trading
in customer nondiscretionary trading accounts. 210 The application of Rule
lob-5 to broker conversions of customer property will strengthen the status
21
of Rule lob-5 as the most significant investor protection law ever created. '
WILLIAM WALTHER SENFT

203. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (discussing deceptive, and therefore
dishonest and unethical, nature of broker conversions of customer proeprty).
204. See supra notes 58-59, 61, 76, & 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts
and inconsistencies in federal court resolutions concerning applicability of Rule lob-5 to broker
conversions).
205. See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text (distinguishing between broker thefts,
misappropriations, pledges, or unauthorized trading in determining Rule lob-5 applicability is
improper).
206. See supra notes 157-86 and accompanying text (broker conversions constitute fraud
and deception in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
207. See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text (discussing practical aspects of
litigating broker conversion claims under Rule lOb-5).
. 208. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (applicability of Rule lOb-5 to
broker conversions serves purposes of Rule lOb-5).
209. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (broker thefts, misappropriations,
and pledges of customer securities should be within scope of Rule lOb-5).
210. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (Rule lob-5 should apply to unauthorized
broker trading in customers' nondiscretionary trading accounts).
211. See JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 1 (Rule lob-5 is most important securities regulation
in United States).

